Asymmetries on European labour markets by Bruno, C. & Fuss, C.
ASYMMETRIES ON EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS
Catherine Bruno and Catherine Fuss
(OFCE, IDEI et Université Libre de Bruxelles)
N° 99-03
August 199923
Abstract: The paper investigates adjustment mechanisms (and their evolution) to asymmetric
labour market shocks. Asymmetric labour demand and labour supply shocks are identified
from a structural VAR for employment, unemployment rate, participation rate and real wages.
We use Blanchard and Katz (1992) methodology to decompose the effects of these shocks on
the number of employed, unemployed, migrants and variations in the labour force. Our results
indicate that, in spite of some common features, asymmetric shocks are an important
component of short-term labour market fluctuations and that there are no common European
adjustment mechanisms to labour market shocks.
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1. Introduction
As the process towards European Monetary Union went on, many papers were
devoted to the evaluation of asymmetric shocks and the way by which EMU could deal with
them. Asymmetric shocks may generate output and employment imbalances across regions or
countries. These imbalances may be absorbed through wages and prices adjustments. In a
monetary union with stable prices and fixed wages, labour mobility is expected to play a
crucial role in the adjustment process. In the absence of labour mobility, decentralised
stabilisation policies may be necessary. This paper focuses on labour market asymmetries. It
compares the adjustment mechanisms to a set of asymmetric labour market shocks for eleven
European countries: Austria, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. It also analyses the evolution of these
adjustment mechanisms over time.
Blanchard and Katz (1992), Decressin and Fatas (1995) and Obstfeld and Peri (1997)
(thereafter BK, DF and OP) assess the importance of intra-national labour mobility in the
adjustment to an interregional asymmetric labour demand shock, for the US states and regions
of some EU countries
1. On the basis of a structural VAR, they find that most of the
adjustment to labour demand shocks is undertaken by labour migration in the United States
and by changes in the participation rate in Europe. Using a different methodology, Gabriel,
Shack-Marquez and Wascher (1993) find that interregional migrations help to absorb a small
fraction of interregional unemployment differences in the US
2.
This paper investigates the way in which national labour markets respond to a set of
asymmetric shocks. We try to answer the following questions « how do European countries
allocate the burden of asymmetric shocks among employment, unemployment, participation
and migration? what is the role of wages in this process?  and how has this allocation evolved
over time? ».
We look at aggregate national effects of asymmetric shocks. At the national level,
labour mobility consists in variation in participation of residents to the labour market and
migrations. We do not compare regions submitted to the same economic, legal, sociological
                                                                
1  Blanchard and Katz consider US States. Decressin and Fatas consider 51  EU regions over 1975-1987 in
Europe (this includes France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal), and 51 US States over 1976-1990. Obstfeld and Peri use data from
national statistical institutes for Canadian, Italian and German regions.
2  They rely on estimations of interregional migration probabilities together with data on participation and
unemployment rates of migrants. Migration probabilities depend on relative wages, unemployment and6
structure; rather we compare different labour market structures in order to highlight the
heterogeneity of European labour markets. These may turn to be important in the discussion
about common European labour market, or common EU labour legislation.
Concerning the legislation of migration flows in Europe, the main steps towards a joint
migration policy are the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990, whose objectives are the
elimination of internal border checks. In our country panel, France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Austria are EMU members that have signed the Schengen
Accords. Norway, the United Kingdom and Switzerland are not EMU members, and have not
signed the Schengen Accords
3.
With respect to migration, European countries may be classified according to three
types. First, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Switzerland received considerable labour
migration from the sixties to 1974. Family and political migration dominated the period of
restrained migration since 1974 with a political migration boom in 1988, especially in
Germany (Zimmermann, 1995)
4. Second, some other European countries have at past and
present a small community of foreigners. This group includes southern European countries –
Italy, Spain and Portugal – that sent a lot of people over Europe and the world during the last
thirty years. Third, there is no migration tradition in the new EU members – Austria, Sweden,
and Finland – but these countries all provide very high standards of living and therefore are
attractive destinations for immigration.  So, our eleven-country panel is not homogenous in
terms of past and present migration. It is sometimes argued that migration is too small in EU
countries to play much of a role in adjusting national differences in unemployment and wages
over the cycle. We investigate this fact in analysing the effects of asymmetric labour market
shocks on migration in eleven European countries.
In order to focus on asymmetric shocks, the data considered are taken in deviations
from the international average, along the lines of BK and OP. Using deviations from the
average captures two types of asymmetries, the ones which are due to national specific or
idiosyncratic shocks and the ones which result from different responses to common shocks. If
countries have the same labour market structure (institutions, bargaining level, …) they may
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
housing costs, education, the percentage of population that is not in the agricultural sector, and population
size in the destination region.
3  We believe that the inclusion of non Shengen countries should not harm the results because intra-EU labour
mobility legislation is recent and does not cover the entire period under consideration (1966-1993). A
separate analysis for Shengen and non-Shengen countries would not permit a comparison between the two
groups because the cross-section average would be different so that the two analyses may capture different
types of asymmetries.
4  For example, the total number of refugees was about 7.000.000 in Europe in 1992. In particular, Germany
received 1.5 million new immigrants. Hence, Germany is the key European country  of migration7
experience asymmetric economic fluctuations due to the occurrence of specific shocks. If,
further, countries have heterogeneous labour market structures, a shock common to all
countries may have a different impact on each market. The analysis highlights differences
rather than similarities.
We depart from BK, DF and OP in several ways. Our focus is on national labour
market rather than regional labour markets. We estimate the model for each country
separately, rather than jointly. We identify two labour market shocks – a labour demand shock
and a labour supply shock – rather than a labour demand shock only. We include wages
directly in the model in order to evaluate their role in the adjustment mechanism. Finally, we
take into account the non-stationarity of the variables.
Our results indicate that in spite of some common features, European labour markets
use heterogeneous adjustment mechanisms in response to asymmetric shocks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 exposes the data and the
methodology. Results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
Data and methodology
We use quarterly OECD data on the logarithm of total employment (number of
persons), unemployment rate (in %), participation rates (in %) and real wages (in PPA units)
over the period 1966.1-1993.1
5.
We consider eleven European countries: Austria (Aut), Finland (Fin), France (Fra),
Germany (Ger), Italy (Ita), Norway (Nor), Portugal (Por), Spain (Spa), Sweden (Swe),
Switzerland (Swz) and the United Kingdom (UK). The set of countries does not cover all EU,
and some non-EU countries are included in the sample.  The choice of the sample is based on
data homogeneity, in particular, data availability and statistical (unit root) properties.
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with constant and deterministic trend indicate that all
series (in deviation to the 11-country average) are integrated of order one
6.
The methodology builds on Blanchard and Quah (1989) for the identification of the
VAR, and uses Blanchard and Katz (1992) to decompose the effects of the shocks in
variations in the number of employed, unemployed, migrants and residents participating to the
                                                                
5  The sample is restricted to 1993 due to data availability.
6  The tests are not reported here for the sake of brevity but are available on request.8
labour market. BK, DF and OP estimate a VAR for the three variables system of relative
employment, unemployment and participation rate. The labour demand shock is identified as
the only shock that has contemporaneous effect on employment. The two other shocks are
unidentified.
We depart from BK, DF and OP in several ways. First, we estimate the model for each
country separately, while BK, DF and OP use panel regression analysis to evaluate the
average response of migration to asymmetric labour demand shocks. Thus, we capture each
country ‘s adjustment mechanisms, while BK, DF and OP measure the average adjustment.
Second, while BK, DF and OP focus on labour demand shocks alone leaving the other
shocks unidentified, we propose a more complete description of labour markets and identify a
labour demand shock and a labour supply shock.
Third, contrary to Blanchard and Katz (1992), we analyse the response of wages to
shocks jointly with the other variables of the system. Further, we focus on real wages rather
than on nominal hourly earnings. We believe that the former may be more relevant than the
latter to understand the responses of job creation and labour supply by residents and migrants.
Fourth, while BK, DF and OP only give the adjustment mechanism for one year, we
compute the BK decomposition for each year of the sample in order to analyse the evolution
of adjustment mechanisms. This can be done in a very simple way: the VAR estimation
provides the impulse response at every horizon k. The k-horizon BK decomposition at year t
is obtained by applying the k-horizon impulse responses to the level of employment,
unemployment rate and participation rate of year t. BK, DF and OP apply this to the base
year; we apply it to every year of the sample. We then obtain the series of the variations in the
number of employed, unemployed, residents participating to the labour market and migrants,
in response to an asymmetric shock occurring at time t, after k periods
7. Thus we can analyse
the evolution of adjustment mechanisms on the basis of coefficients which are constant over
the whole sample period. Appendix A describes Blanchard-Katz decomposition.
Finally, BK, DF and OP assume that all series (in deviation from the national average)
are stationary. This property is not satisfied by national data. Therefore, we will consider a
VAR with possibly cointegration relationships. In this framework, the shocks may have
                                                                
7  To see this, consider the following example. Suppose that the one-year response of employment to a negative
labour demand shock is equal to –5%. Suppose further that total employment is equal to 1000 in 1970 and to
1200 in 1980. The variation in the number of employees one year after a shock occurring in 1970 will be –50,
and after a shock occurring in 1980, –60.9
permanent or transitory effects on employment, unemployment and participation rates, and
wages differences
8.
The rest of this section discusses the measurement of asymmetries, and exposes the
specification and identification of the VAR.
How to capture asymmetries
 In order to focus on asymmetric shocks, BK and OP consider the difference of
regional series to the national average. DF consider the residual of a regression of the regional
series on the national average. The difference between the two approaches is that BK and OP
capture idiosyncratic shocks as well as common shocks with heterogeneous effects, while DF
focus on idiosyncratic shocks. To see this, assume that the regional series Yit admits a static
one-factor model with the national average, Yt, as the common factor
9:
(1) Yit = a + bi.Yt + eit
BK and OP consider Yit-Yt = (bi-1)Yit + eit  while DF consider Yit-bi.Yt = eit.
10 We adopt BK
and OP specification and consider the difference to the European average, i.e. Yit is national
series and Yt the international average.
Our analysis focuses on the comparison of impulse responses of employment,
unemployment rate, participation rate and real wages to a set of structural shocks. When one
considers deviations from the average, differences in the impulse responses across countries
may have three origins: differences in the correlation of each variable with the average,
difference in the size (the variance) of idiosyncratic shocks across countries, differences in the
covariance between the idiosyncratic shocks, and between the idiosyncratic shocks related to
one variable and the average of another variable, across countries
11.
Many papers assess the importance of asymmetric shocks
12. As an indication, we
assess the degree of short-term asymmetries along the lines of Decressin and Fatas (1995),
                                                                
8  Transitory and permanent shocks are expected to be absorbed through different channels. As shown, by
Topel (1986), using microeconomic data, a transitory shock has a larger impact on wages and a lower impact
on migration than a permanent one.
9  The average of a set of series has frequently been used as a proxy for the common shock, implicitly as in
Quah (1994), or explicitly as in Forni and Reichlin (1997), for instance.
10  See also the discussion in Obstfeld and Perri (1998).
11  See appendix B for more details.
12  See for instance, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992, 1996), Decressin and Fatas (1995), Forni and Reichlin
(1997), Fuss (1998), for different variables, and measures of asymmetries.10
Forni and Reichlin (1997) and Fuss (1998). The degree of integration is captured by the
percentage of variance of national series explained by the international average, i.e. by the R²
of the regression of equation (1). A low R² indicates that a high percentage of the variance of
the national series is explained by idiosyncratic shocks. Further, if bi is different from one,
countries have heterogeneous responses to the common shocks.
In order to illustrate the importance of short-term asymmetries, we estimate equation
(1) for each variable, in first difference of log, and each country. Results are reported in table
1 below.
Table 1. Regression of the national series on the international average
Employment Unemployment rate
R² bi t(bi=1) R² bi t(bi=1)
Aut 0,09 0,27 -8,94 0,11 0,41 -5,29
Fin 0,19 1,06 0,31 0,26 0,9 -0,71
Fra 0,18 0,28 -12,9 0,27 0,26 -18,42
Ger 0,36 3,96 5,85 0,22 0,74 -1,98
Ita 0,11 0,57 -2,72 0,02 0,12 -12,3
Nor 0,02 0,33 -3,31 0,09 0,59 -2,36
Por 0,20 1,52 1,8 0,13 0,5 -3,93
Spa 0,21 0,87 -0,83 0,18 0,28 -12,62
Swe 0,29 1,09 0,55 0,12 0,5 -3,83
Swz 0,15 0,62 -2,69 0,72 6,14 13,97
UK 0,08 0,42 -4,34 0,29 0,57 -4,99
Mean 0,17 1 -2,47 0,22 1 -4,77
Std dev 0,10 1,06 5,12 0,19 1,72 8,3011
Table 1. Regression of the national series on the international average
Participation rate Real wages
R² bi t(bi=1) R² bi t(bi=1)
Aut 0,39 4,15 6,31 0,10 0,66 -1,77
Fin 0,23 1,05 0,30 0,24 0,86 -0,93
Fra 0,12 0,36 -6,99 0,28 0,77 -1,94
Ger 0,05 0,38 -4,11 0,19 1,28 1,11
Ita 0,17 0,97 -0,14 0,24 0,96 -0,27
Nor 0,00 -0,16 -3,84 0,20 0,80 -1,36
Por 0,26 2,58 3,84 0,44 2,43 5,48
Spa 0,07 0,44 -3,57 0,21 0,81 -1,31
Swe 0,03 0,31 -4,02 0,20 0,90 -0,61
Swz 0,04 0,76 -0,66 0,26 0,72 -2,45
UK 0,02 0,16 -7,58 0,14 0,83 -0,88
Mean 0,13 1 -1,86 0,23 1 -0,45
Std dev 0,12 1,27 4,29 0,09 0,50 2,18
The R² are very low on average (17% for employment, 22% for unemployment rates,
13% for participation rates, and 23% for real wages), and rarely exceed 30%. This indicates a
low degree of integration; idiosyncratic shocks play a prominent role in the variations of these
variables in Europe
13. Further, the estimates show that bi is rarely equal to unity, indicating
that the other source of asymmetries - different responses to the average - may also be an
important part of the story.
VAR specification
We estimate, for each country, a VAR for the four variables system of employment,
unemployment rate, participation rate and real compensations. The order of the VAR is
selected in order to satisfy, as much as possible, the following criteria: (1) the residuals must
be serially uncorrelated, (2) the residuals should be normally distributed, (3) the number of
cointegration relationships, as identified by Johanssen trace and maximum eigenvalue tests,
cannot exceed three. Details and tests are given in appendix C.
                                                                
13 The low values of the R² may also result from misspecification of equation (1). In particular, the national
series may depend on lagged values of the international average. Examining this issue is beyond the scope of
this paper. Further, specification (1) copes with the transformation of the series (difference to the
international average).12
Identification
Blanchard and Katz (1992) estimate a VAR in employment, unemployment and
participation rate. They identify the labour demand shock as the only shock that has
contemporaneous effect on employment. The two other shocks are unidentified. They
estimate the response of employment, unemployment and participation to a labour demand
shock, and estimate the response of migration residually (see Appendix A for details).
We estimate a four variables system. This allows us to estimate jointly the response of
real wages to labour demand shocks
14. We identify two shocks: a labour demand shock and a
labour supply shock. Two shocks are unidentified. Three identification restrictions focus on
contemporaneous relationships, one on long-term ones
15.
The labour demand shock may have contemporaneous effects on the real wage
although the other shocks have not. The labour demand shock has no long-term effect on real
wages. We have in mind a theoretical model in which, in the short run, firms determine wages
and capital is fixed. In the long run, the capital stock adjusts to labour demand shocks, so that
labour productivity, hence real wages, returns to its initial level. Therefore, we identify the
labour demand shock as the shock with no permanent effect on real wages. Further, the labour
demand shock has no contemporaneous effect on the participation rate.
Labour supply shocks may have contemporaneous effects on the participation rate but
not on employment. Labour supply shocks increase the labour force and may involve increase
in the participation of residents as well as migrations.
3. Results 
We should keep in mind that all series must be interpreted in terms of deviations from
the average. In the following comments, short-term means one year after the shock; long-term
                                                                
14  Blanchard and Katz estimate two separate VARs, one with employment, unemployment and participation,
the other with employment and nominal hourly earnings.
15  We also estimate the four variable VAR system with labour demand shocks identified as employment
innovations (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). This choice does not modify the results.13
five years after the shock
16. For the sake of brevity, we do not report full results in the text.
These are available on request
17.
Variance decomposition
Table 2 below reports the percentage of variance of relative employment (E),
unemployment rate (UR), participation rate (PR) and real wages (RW) explained by the
labour demand shock (e
ld) and the labour supply shock (e
ls), at the one-year and five-year
forecast horizons.
There are some regularities concerning variance decompositions. Relative employment
is explained by labour demand shocks except in France, Norway and Switzerland in the long
run. Note that labour market shocks explain less than 30% of relative employment
fluctuations in the long run in France, Finland, Germany, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.
Relative unemployment rate is mainly explained by labour supply shocks in the short
and long runs, though to a lower extent in Finland and Germany.
Labour market shocks are not the main source of relative participation rate and relative
real wages fluctuations, both in the short and long runs. Relative participation rate is not
explained by labour market shocks in the short run. In the long run, labour demand shocks
explain respectively 30% and 40% of relative participation rate fluctuations in France and
Sweden. Labour supply shocks explain respectively 20%, 30% and 40% of relative
participation rate fluctuations in Finland, Norway  and the United-Kingdom.
Concerning relative real wages, the situation is a little bit different. Actually, relative
real wages are explained in the short run by labour demand shocks in Germany (40%),
Portugal (60%) and Switzerland (60%). In the long run, labour market shocks explain more
than 50% of relative real wage fluctuations in Portugal and Switzerland. Our model tells us
nothing about relative real wage fluctuations in the other European countries.
                                                                
16  We choose one year as the short term because migration and participation decisions may take time. At the
five years horizon, impulse responses become stable.
17  With the set of identifying restrictions in the short and long runs, the VAR model describing Austria is not
stable in the long run. So, we do not estimate the Austrian model .14
Table 2. Variance decomposition of prediction error




ld 60% 75% 40% 80% 60% 12% 60% 40% 80% 3%
e
ls 5% 5% 10% 2% 30% 0% 0% 5% 5% 15%
5-years
e
ld 20% 25% 12% 80% 40% 13% 10% 40% 90% 2%
e





ld 20% 4% 0% 10% 15% 5% 2% 0% 10% 1%
e
ls 50% 90% 70% 90% 80% 90% 90% 80% 90% 65%
5-years
e
ld 15% 0% 5% 10% 20% 10% 0% 20% 10% 5%
e




ld 0% 8% 0% 2% 0% 2% 0% 10% 0% 2%
e
ls 10% 4% 3% 2% 20% 2% 0% 10% 0% 2%
5-years
e
ld 0% 30% 0% 12% 5% 3% 0% 40% 10% 4%
e




ld 3% 14% 40% 0% 6% 65% 4% 4% 0% 60%
e
ls 17% 1% 4% 0% 6% 5% 0% 1% 0% 10%
5-years
e
ld 5% 6% 10% 0% 4% 25% 3% 2% 0% 24%
e
ls 27% 1% 5% 0% 20% 50% 0% 2% 2% 20%15
Negative labour demand shock
18
Following a one-standard-deviation negative labour demand (LD for short) shock,
employment decreases significantly in the short run, in all countries except Switzerland
(actually, LD shocks have no significant effect on labour market variables in Switzerland). In
the long run, the shock has a permanent and negative effect on employment in all countries
except France, Germany and Spain. In the first one, it has a permanent positive effect on
employment although, in the two other ones, it has only a negative transitory one. In the long
and short runs, LD shocks lead to an increase in unemployment rate in Finland, Italy, Portugal
and the United Kingdom. They have no effect on unemployment rate in France, Germany,
Spain and Switzerland. LD shocks have also no effect on participation rate, except in France
(a positive one in the long run), Italy  and the United Kingdom (a negative one). In the short
run, LD shocks have a negative effect on real wages in France, Finland and Germany and a
positive one in Portugal.
We comment the one-year Blanchard-Katz decompositions only because, for almost
every country, the decompositions at the one-year and five-year horizon exhibit the same
patterns; the size of the responses may vary though. In all countries except Germany, Spain
and Switzerland, the one-year-adjustment mechanism to a negative labour demand shock has
the following three characteristics. First, employment diminishes and the number of
unemployed increases because the labour force diminishes less than employment. Second, the
reduction in the labour force results from out-migrations that are partly compensated by
increased participation of residents. Third, this adjustment mechanism has evolved over time,
as countries rely more and more on unemployment and less and less on migrations, while the
number of job losses is relatively stable over time. While the adjustment pattern is similar
across countries, the size of the adjustment differs. For instance, the variation in the number
of unemployed in percentage of the number of job losses (averaged over the last five years)
varies from 31% in the United Kingdom to 77% in Italy. Figure 1 below illustrates these for
France.
                                                                
18  Confidence bands on the IRFs figures are computed by a Monte Carlo procedure. We perform random
drawings from the distribution of the structural VAR model for each country. Confidence bands are not
stable in Norway and Sweden ; therefore we do not consider these countries.  IRFs figures for France and
Italy are available in appendix D.16


















changes in active population 
changes in the number of unemployed
changes in the number of employed




















changes in active population 
changes in the number of migrants
changes in participation of residents
The evolution of variations in participation of residents varies from one country to the
other: it is stable in France, Germany and the United Kingdom; it decreases over time in
Finland and Italy; it increases in Portugal and Switzerland.
In Germany, the adjustment mechanism has remained relatively stable over time, as
illustrated in Figure 2 below. Also, Germany differs from other countries in that the number
of unemployed remains almost unchanged because the reduction in the labour force is close to
the number of job losses.
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In Switzerland, a negative labour demand shock induces a decrease in the number of
unemployed because of massive out-migrations, and despite some increased participation of17
residents to the labour force. The importance of this phenomenon has grown in the last twenty
years.
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In Spain, the response of migration and participation varies over time. In the sixties
and seventies, a negative labour demand shock induces some additional unemployment
because out-migrations are compensated by increased participation of residents. In the mid-
eighties and in the early nineties, job losses still imply more unemployed but the labour force
did not diminish enough to compensate for in-migrations.
From the variance decomposition, the impulse responses and the BK decompositions,
it is not possible to evidence a typology of countries with the same adjustment mechanism.
The direction and size of the adjustment vary across countries.
Positive labour supply shock
19
Following a positive labour supply (LS for short) shock,  participation rate increases in
the short run in Finland and Germany. In other countries, LS shocks have no significant short-
run effect on participation rate. Nevertheless, in the long run, participation rate increases in all
countries except Spain. Employment increases in Finland, Germany, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom in the short and long runs. Unemployment rate increases in Italy and Spain
in the short and long runs. In other countries, it decreases in the short and long runs. Real
                                                                
19 See IRFs figures D3 and D4 for France and Italy in appendix D. Confidence bands are not stable in Norway
and Sweden; therefore we do not consider these countries.18
wages increase in Finland in the short run and in Finland, Portugal and Switzerland in the
long run. In other countries, LS shocks have no significant effect on real wages.
  The adjustment mechanism in the number of employed, unemployed, migrants, etc…,
in response to a positive labour supply shock is identical in all countries, although the size of
the effects may differ across countries. A positive labour supply shock increases the number
of unemployed because the number of jobs diminishes (except in Italy where it increases, but
by a low extent). Note that the increase in the labour force corresponds to in-migrations and
induces a reduction in the participation of residents to the labour market. Figure 4 below
illustrates this for France. Note also that the increase in the number of unemployed does not
imply an increase in the unemployment rate. In France and Germany, in the long run, the
unemployment rate returns to its initial level.
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Although there are common features in the adjustment mechanisms to a labour supply
shock, across countries, the size of the adjustment differs. For instance, the variation in the
number of residents participating to the labour market in percentage of the variation in the
labour force (averaged over the last five years) varies from -29% in the United Kingdom to -
162% in Spain.
As for labour demand shocks, the analysis evidences heterogeneity of labour market
adjustment mechanisms to labour supply asymmetric shocks.19
Conclusion
We investigate asymmetries in European national labour markets, in a structural VAR
framework. We analyse the responses of employment, the unemployment rate, the
participation rate and real wages to a set of asymmetric labour market shocks: a labour
demand shock and a labour supply shock. We then decompose the adjustment to the shock in
variation of the number of employed, the number of unemployed, the number of migrants and
the variation in the participation of residents using Blanchard and Katz (1992) methodology.
Variance decompositions indicate that employment fluctuations depend on labour
demand shocks, while unemployment rate fluctuations depend on labour supply shocks.
Labour market shocks do not explain much of real wage and participation rate fluctuations.
Actually, participation rate and real wage fluctuations are not mainly explained by labour
market shocks as identified here. The sources of their fluctuations should be found outside the
labour market.
Impulse responses show that, except in Switzerland, in the short run, a negative labour
demand shock reduces employment. It increases unemployment - except in Switzerland,
Germany, Spain and France - because the labour force diminishes less than employment, out-
migrations are compensated by increased participation. The Blanchard-Katz decomposition
evidences evolving adjustment mechanisms, as countries rely more and more on
unemployment and less and less on migrations, while the number of job losses is relatively
stable over time.
In response to a positive labour supply shock, participation rates increase significantly
in the long run. Employment increases and unemployment rate decreases except in Italy and
Spain. In these two countries, labour supply shocks have no significant effects on
employment, while the unemployment rate increases in the short and long runs. Real wages
augment in Switzerland, Portugal and Finland.
Our analysis may also provide information on the persistence of unemployment
differentials. The labour demand shock does not explain relative unemployment rates in
France, Germany, Spain and Switzerland: in these four countries, unemployment rate remains
unchanged in the short and long runs following a labour demand shock, although it augments
in the other countries. Following a positive labour supply shock, the unemployment rate
augments in Italy and Spain, and decreases in other countries. So, the persistence of20
unemployment in Germany, Switzerland and France is not due to labour demand shocks. This
result is important in terms of economic policy. It suggests that unemployment in these
countries should be fought by policy measures concerning not only labour demand but the
global functioning of the economic activity.
In spite of similarities with respect to some shocks and/or variables, the picture that
emerges from the analysis is rather one of a large variety of adjustment mechanisms. The
percentage of variance explained by each shock varies across variables and across countries.
The effects of each type of shock - labour demand or labour supply - differ across countries.
So, there is no single European labour market.
The evidence of heterogeneous adjustment mechanisms may be taken as supportive of
the need for labour market harmonisation. However, the importance of idiosyncratic shocks in
explaining short-term asymmetries should be considered seriously. Even if adjustment
mechanisms were alike, countries would experience asymmetric specific shocks. The
construction of a single labour market in Europe should be performed very carefully, taking
into account all types of asymmetries - asymmetric shocks, asymmetric responses to the
shocks - and considering the entire functioning of labour markets rather than one adjustment
mechanism alone. A partial harmonisation may have very different implications in the various
countries, because European labour markets have different structures, different adjustment
mechanisms, and are subjected to different shocks.21
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Appendix A : Migration response in Blanchard-Katz framework
Denote by et employment, Ut unemployment rate, ut the number of unemployed, pt
participation rate, popactivet active population, popt total population, pop15-64t working age
population
Blanchard and Katz (1992) estimate a VAR for (et, Ut, pt) in logarithm, and obtain the
responses of e, u p to an adverse unit labour demand shock. Since variables are in log, one
obtains the responses in growth rate :
(B1) Det/et = a
(B2) DUt/Ut = Dut/ut - Dpopactt./popactt. = b
(B3) Dpt/pt =Dpopactt/popactt - Dpop15-64t/pop15-64t = g
To find the response of migration to a labour market shock, additional hypothesis are
necessary. If one assumes that population does not react to a labour market shock (the fertility
rate does not respond to a labour market shock), all population increase is due to migrations.
(B4) Dpopt = Dpopmigrt
On the other hand, population and working age population can be decomposed into active
population and inactive population :
(B5) Dpopt = Dpopactt + Dpopinactt
(B6) Dpop15-64t = Dpopact.15-64t + Dpopinact.15-64t
If one assumes further that all migration is in the working age population,
(B7) Dpopmigrt = Dpopt = Dpop15-64t
one can solve for migration on the basis of the impulses for et, Ut and pt (B1), (B2) and (B3).
Rewrite equations (B1) and (B2) as
(B8) Det = a.et23
(B9) Dut = b.ut + Dpopactt.ut/popactt
Equation (B4) becomes
(B10) Dpopactt = a.et + b.ut + Dpopactt.ut/popactt
Dpopactt = (a.et + b.ut)/(1-ut/popactt)
Dpopactt = (a.et + b.ut)/(et/popactt)
And from (B3) and (B7) one obtains








This decomposition can be computed for any basis year t, and for any horizon of the
impulse responses. We use the a, b , g, which correspond to the one-year and five-year
horizons. For each of these a, b, g, we perform the decomposition for every basis year: from
1966 to 1993.24
Appendix B : Asymmetric shocks
For simplicity, consider a bivariate system of Y it and Xit, and two countries, 1 and 2.
Assume that national series admit a static factor model with the international average as the
common factor :
X1t = b1.Xt + e1t
X2t = b2.Xt + e2t
Y1t = g1.Yt + h1t
Y2t = g2.Yt + h2t
with  eit  independant of  Xt,  hit  independant of Y t, We consider the difference to the
international average, i.e. xit=(bi-1)Xit+eit  and yit=(gi-1)Yit+hit
There are two types of asymmetries : asymmetries in the coefficient on the average :
b1„b2 and g1„g2, and asymmetries related to idiosyncratic shocks, e1t is independent of e2t and
h1t is independent of h2t.
For simplicity, consider a model with no dynamics between a VAR(0) in xit and yit:
(A1)  x1t = d1.y1t + x1t
(A2) x2t = d2.y2t + x2t
If one performs an OLS regression of  xit on  yit in each country, we obtain the
following estimates :
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²  denotes the variance of z and s vw, the covariance between v and w.
$ d1„ $ d2 as soon as (1) the correlation of each variable with the average differs across
countries, i.e. : b1„b2„1 or g1„g2„1, (2) the size (the variance) of idiosyncratic shocks differs
across countries, i.e. if s²e1„s²e2 or s²h1„s²h2, (3) the covariance between the idiosyncratic
shocks, and between the idiosyncratic shocks and the average, varies across countries, i.e if
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se1h1„ se2h2 or sxh1„ sxh2 or sye1„ sye2. The argument extends to more than two countries,
more than two variables, and dynamic relationships between the series.26
Appendix C : VAR specification
Table C1 below reports the p-value of the tests for serial correlation and normality, and the
order of the VAR, p
20. In general, residuals satisfy the criterion of no order one serial
correlation at the 5% level, except in Finland and France. Normality is accepted everywhere.
Table C1. VAR(p) specification
p H0: e ~AR(1) H0: e ~AR(4) H0: e~N(.)
Aut
Fin 1 0,04 0,23 0,77
Fra 2 0,01 0,68 0,40
Ger 1 0,05 0,04 0,07
Ita 1 0,05 0,21 0,38
Nor 2 0,08 0,53 0,22
Por 2 0,11 0,40 0,76
Spa 1 0,15 0,05 1,00
Swe 1 0,32 0,27 0,50
Swz 1 0,43 0,50 0,98
UK 1 0,33 0,06 0,27
e~AR(1) gives the p-value for the test that the residuals are serially correlated of order one
e~AR(4) gives the p-value for the test that the residuals are serially correlated of order four
e~N() gives the p-value for the test that the residuals are normally distributed
Table C2 reports trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for this specification of the
order of the VAR. We consider the 5% critical values of the model with constant and trend in
the data generating process; r is the number of cointegration relationships. The number of
cointegration relationships varies from one country to the other. There is a conflict between
the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests for Germany. The trace test suggests that there are
four cointegration relationships where the maximum eigenvalue test indicates one
cointegration relationship. Since four cointegration relationships correspond to the stationary
case, and since this is inconsistent with the unit root tests, we consider the case of one
cointegration relationship in Germany.
                                                                
20  Tests on this hypothesis are performed using CATS in RATS.27
Table C2. Cointegration tests
l max Trace
R r=0 r<=1 r<=2 r<=3 r=0 r<=1 r<=2 r<=3
Aut
Fin 2 28.77 22.92 6.99 3.47 62.14 33.38 10.46 3.47
Fra 1 31.97 17.54 9.46 0.02 58.99 27.01 9.48 0.02
Ger 2 40.30 18.69 11.46 4.24 74.70 34.39 15.71 4.24
Ita 1 28.48 9.31 6.86 0.11 44.75 16.28 6.96 0.11
Nor 1 37.86 18.23 7.05 0.67 63.81 25.95 7.71 0.67
Por 2 53.58 29.82 9.76 0.01 93.17 39.59 9.77 0.01
Spa 2 43.36 29.41 9.58 1.62 83.96 40.61 11.20 1.62
Swe 1 33.61 14.61 9.22 3.88 61.32 27.71 13.10 3.88
Swz 1 58.97 9.67 5.07 2.24 75.95 16.98 7.31 2.24
UK 1 33.37 8.48 6.99 1.68 50.52 17.15 8.67 1.68
1% 31.943 25.521 17.936 6.936 53.792 35.397 19.310 6.936
5% 27.169 20.778 14.036 3.962 47.181 29.509 15.197 3.962
10% 24.712 18.697 12.099 2.816 43.964 29.791 13.338 2.816
Johanssen cointegration tests with constant and trend in the data generating process.
Critical values are given in Johanssen and Juselius (1992).
L max stands for the maximum eigenvalue test, trace stands for the trace test.28
Appendix D : Impulse response functions (IRFs)
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